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AMENDING SECTION 5391, REVISED STATUTES. 
OCTOBER 24, 1893.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. 
Mr. LAYTON, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the fol-
lowing . 
REPORT: 
[To accompany H. R. 3981.] 
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was refeITed the bill (H. 
R. 3981) to amend section 5391 of the United States Revised Statutes, 
submit the following report: 
This bill is, substantially, a reenactment of the existing law, viz, sec-
tion 5391 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, passed April 5, 
1866. with slight changes in the phraseology. 
It , provides, in substance, that the laws of the respective States in 
which reservation or places under exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States are located, relative to certain minor offenses, shall be applica-
ble to such reservation or places, and offenses therein may be proceeded 
against under such laws in the trnited States court having jurisdiction~ 
It has been judicially determined that the present law is operative 
to put in force only the laws of such States as existed at the time of the 
last enactment of said section 5391, viz, April 5, 1866; hence the 
necessity of this reenactment, so as to apply to all such reservations 
and places in States admitted into the Union since the last-mentioned 
date. 
Your committee report the bill favorably, with a recommendation 
that it do pass with the following amendments: 
Insert after the word '' States," in the title of the bill, the following 
words, '' relating to the punishment of certain minor offenses iu reser-
vations or places over which the United States has exclusive jurisdic-
tion." 
Strike out the words "such offense," in the eleventh line, and insert 
in lieu thereof '' any person so committing the same." 
Strike out the word "existing," in the fourteenth line, and insert the 
words "now in force," at the end of said fourteenth lip.e. Sajd section, 
as amended, will then read as follows: 
A.. BILL to amend section fifty-three hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States, relating to the punishment of certain minor offenses in reservations or places over which the 
United States has exclusive jurisdiction. 
S E C. 5391. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That if any offense be committed in a,ny place, juris-
dict ion over which has been retained by the United States or ceded to it by a State, 
or which has been purchased with the consent of a State for the erection of a fort, 
magazine, arsenal, dock yard, or other needful building, the punishment for which 
offense is not provided for by any law of the United States, any person so committing 
t he same shall, upon conviction in a circuit or district court of the United States for 
·the district in which it was committed, be liable to and receive the same punishment 
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th law of th tate in whi h uch place js situated now in force provide for the 
like oft'ensowben committed within the juri iliction of uch State; and no subsequent 
r peal of an. u h tate faw hall affect any such prosecution. 
Thi 1 i lation i approved and recommended by the Secretary of 
ar aud th Attorney-General also, as shown by copy of Executive 
Document r o. 14, this Oongre' , hereto attached, marked Exhibit A, 
and by letter of the Attorney-General, dated October 20, 1893, hereto 
attached, marked Exhibit B, and both made part of this report. 
EXHIBIT A. 
[HollSe Ex. Doc. No. 14, Fifty-third Congress, first session.) 
WAR DEPARTMENT, 
Wash-ington, D. C., October 6, 1893. 
Sm: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter dated Ja.nuary 20, 
1893 from the commanding officer at Fort Logan, Colo., reporting the result of a 
pro 'cution instituted against W. E. Curran et als. for an offense committed on that 
military re ervation on July 8, 1890, the offense being an aggravated assault ou tbree 
laundrymen, employed at the post, by a party of citizens who entered upon the 
res rvation, seized the men, and treated them in a brutal manner for the ostensible 
purpo e of xtorting a confes ion of theft. Copies of papers accompanying the 
letter of the po t commander are also transmitted. It appears from the papers that 
th offendin~ citi7, ns were arrested with a. view to being bronght to trial for a vio-
la.ti n of a ·tion 5391 of the Revised tatutes, which is as follows: 
" K • 5391. If any offense be committed in any place which has been or may 
her aJter be c cl d to and under the jurisdiction of the United States, which 
ff n i not prohibited, or the pnnishmf}nt thereof is not specially provided for, 
by anv l:l,w of the nitecl tates, such offense shall be liable to, and receive, the 
am pnni bment a, the laws of the Sta,te in which snch place is l:lituated, now in 
fore , rrovi<lA for the like offense when committed within the jurisdiction · of such 
tate· an<l no ab quent r peal of any sach State law shall affect any prosecution 
for an h off n in any onrt of th United tates ." 
Hat, a. will h e n from the cop,v of the decision rendered by Mr. Justice Hallett 
in th cli. tri<"t · nrt of tbe nitecl tates for the di, trict of Colorado on December 
23 1 2, th m tion to q11a h th irnlictment against them was sustained, for the reason 
that n.t the tiru of the na tmeut of section 5391 Colorado was not then a State iu 
th nion, and tllat none of its laws were adopted or pnt in force 1,y this section, 
and that con <Jucntly the section will never be operative in Colorado to put in 
fi r e th Jaws of the '·tate in respect to crimes committed on Government reserva-
ti n uni r enacted. 
on urriog in th vi ws of the A ting Judge-Advocate-General and the Major-
n ral ommanding the Army, as hown in the accompanying copies, I have the 
honor to ubruit, with a rccomu1 nd:1tiou for favorable legislation by Congress, a 
draft of an a tr ··uacthw section 5391, so as to make it applicable alike to all mili-
tary r servation , whether in new or olcl tates, or whether in Territories, and which 
will al ob applical le to tates hereafter admitted into the Union. 
Y ery respectfully, 
The SPEAKER OF T1ill HOUSE Ol!' REPRESENTATIVES, 
DANIEL S. LAMONT, 
Se<Yretary of War. 
OFFICE OF THE POST COMMANDER, 
Fort Logan, Colo., January 20, 1899. 
Sm: I have the honor to inclose herewith a communication received from United 
tat _ttoi:n . John D. _Fleming, district of Colorado, reporting the result of a 
pro e ·ut1on 10 1tuted agamst W. E. Curran et al. for an offense committed on thi 
military re l'Vation July , 1 90. 
Th oIB n wa a pe uliarly aggravat d as ault on three Chinese laundrymen, 
mploy cl at tbi post, by a party of citizens nuder the lead of one W. E. Curran1 
who entered the re ervatiou at night, seized upon the Chinamen, took them in a 
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wagon about a mile from the post to the place of resi<lence of said Curran, where the 
Chinamen were repeatedly hange<l up by their necks in a most brutal and cruel man-
ner, the rope marks being plainly visible for weeks afterwards. 
The ostensible purpose and motive on the part of the assailants was to extort a 
confession of theft of certain articles of jewelry alleged to have been sent to the 
laundry, accidentally, with clothing by Mrs. Curran. 
It appears to me the defenseless condition of this reservation, and apparently many 
others, against crimes of this nature, as appears from the decision of the court set 
forth, demands the early attention of Congress, and I request that proper action may 
be taken to that end. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
H. C. MERRIAM, 
_ Colonel Seventh Infantry, Commanding Poat. 
The A.DJUTANT-GENERAL, U.S. ARMY, 
Washington, D. C. 




Washington, D. C., Februa.ry 4, 1893. 
Respectfully returned to the Adjutant-General .for the Major-General Commanding 
the Army. 
That a brutal, aggravated assault and battery, such as is here described, can, 
under existing law, be committed with impunity on a military reservation, exclusive 
jurisdiction over which has-as in the case of Fort Logan, Colo.-been ceded to the 
United States, certainly indicates a gross failure of justice which calls for prompt 
discontinuance. _ 
This end may be attained on all reservations within 8tates now in existence by 
reenacting section 5391, Revised Statutes. By that means the laws now in force in 
the various States would be adopted by the United States and made United States 
laws for the reservations in their respective States, just the same as if they were 
taken up one by one and passed in the usual way by Congress and approved by the 
President. It would not only supply the reservations in new States-• such as Fort 
Logan Reservation in Colorado-with such laws as are needed of the character 
under consideration, but it would bring the laws on reservations in old States down 
to date, as it were. 
By the enactment of section 5391 the State laws that were in force at the time of 
the enactment were made United States laws on the reservations. But since that 
time the States have, in many instances, changed their laws, so that now the laws 
of the States are in many respects different from the laws in force on the reserva-
tions in those States. The States could not change the laws on the reservations, of 
course, because they have no jurisdiction over them, and therefore the laws on the 
reservations adopted by the enactment of section 5391 have stood as they were, 
while the laws of the States in which they are located have been undergoing a 
change to keep up with the progress of the times. And it is now desirable to aban-
don and repeal the laws adopted by the enactment of section 5391 and adopt in lieu 
of them the laws of the respective States now in force. As indicated above, this 
may all be done by putti~g the substance of that section into the form of a bill and 
enacting it into law at this time. 
The only other adequate remedy for the evils under consideration would be the 
enactment by Congress of a full penal code of the United States for the reservations, 
etc., over which the United States has jurisdiction. . 
One objection to the latter course would be the almost certain failure to foresee, 
and provide for, all offenses that the code ought to cover; and another-which, by 
the way, may or may not be well founded-would:be that the laws of the reservations 
would in many instances be different on given subjects from those of the Territory 
or the State •that immediately surrounded the reservations. But, on the other hand, 
it might be said in favor of such a code that it would secure a uniformity of laws 
on the reservations. We would then have the same law on a reservation in Virginia 
that we would have on a reservation in North Dakota. 
It is recommended that the Secretllry of War cause the subject to be brought to 
the attention of Congress, with a view to adequate legislation. 
In its absence our military reservations in the new States-too extended to be 
effectually patrolled by the military force-will remain open to the incursions of 
ruffians, etc., and those in the old States will only have the advantage of the laws 
in force in the various States at the time of the enactment of the said section 5391. 
G. NORMAN LIEBER, 
~cting Judge-...J.dvocate-General. 
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H1•:ADQ1JARTERS 01!' TIIE ARMY, 
Washington, February 11, 1899. 
Respectfully submitted to the Secreta;ry of War,. concurring in ~he recomll?-enda-
tion of the Acting Judge-Ad vocate-G~ner al, w1th the. suggestion tL.at 111 the 
r ·•nactment of section 5391 the penalty imposed for the o:ffense should be that pro-
vid d for tbe like offense when committed within the jurisdiction of the State by 
the laws in force at the time the offense is committed, instead ofby the laws ''now in 
force." 
J. M. SCHOFIELD, 
Maj01·-General Commanding. 
WAR D EPARTMENT, Ji'ebr1wry 21, 1893. 
Respectfully returned to the Acting Judge-Advocate-General, to prepare a bill for 
pre entation to Congress whiJh shall meet the case. 
If practicable, and ifit can be _accompl~shed by a S?-?rt bill, it wo:i:ild be better~o 
h ave a law which would be applicable alike to all military reservations, whether m 
new or old, tates, or whether in Tenitories, and which will also be applicable to 
States hereafter admitted. 
As it is not likely that the present Congress wm act upon a new bill, there will be 
time for a thorough examination and preparation. 
L.A. GRANT, 
.Assistant Seoretary of Wa1·. 
(Seventh indorsement.] 
WAR DEPAHTMENT, 
J UDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S 0FI"-!:CE, 
Washington, D. C., Septem ber 29, 1893. 
Respectfully returned to the Secretary of War. 
Attention ii; invited to the accompanying report and draft of proposed legislation, 
preparecl in accordance with the directions of the Assistant Secretary of War, con-
tained in the foregoing indorsement. 
G. NORMAN LIEBER, 
.doting Judge-.Advooctte-GeneraZ. 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 
DISTRICT OF COLORADO, 
Denver, Col., January 18, 1893, 
m: n Fri clay December 23, nltimo, in the United States district court at Den~· 
ver, Jud o- lJallett granted a motion to quash the indictment in the case of the men 
charg l with th a Aault upon the Chinamen npon the reservation at Fort Logan. 
I llav befor J1ad some cone ponclence with you in this matter, and knowing 
your int r sts in the ase, I bave had a copy of the opinion of Judge Hallett made, 
di mi ing tho charge, wl1ich opiuion I send yon herewith. It is very brief, but I 
hink onectly states the law upon the question, as further investigation, subsequent 
t the indictment, convinces me. 
Fir t, it hould be remembered that there is no law in the United States statutes 
dire tly providing punishment for minor offenses when committed by one private 
per on against another in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Gov-
ernment. l{ course, therefore, was had in the indictment in question to that general 
provision of the Revised Statutes of the United States found in section 5391, which 
in ffect provides that in such cases we may proceed under the laws of the State 
again t such offenders. 
Accordingly I had Curran and others indicted under the State statute by the Fed-
eral grand jury for (1) riot, (2) assault (aggravated by beating and wounding the 
Chinam n, tc. ), (3) false imprisonment, etc. 
ow com s the court and says that sectfon 5391, Revised Statutes, United States, 
is operative to pnt in force only the laws of such States as existed at that time of the 
ena ·tm nt of aid section 5391. The effect is, you plainly see from the decision, to 
make that law in ome of the older States (Massachusetts, say) which is not law in 
Colorado, or Montana, or any of the newer tates. 
It i thi peculiarity which leads me to address you at this length; to the end, if 
you think it neces ary, as I certainly do, that appeal may be made to Cono-ress, 
hrou h your own or the proper Department, for the reenactment of section 5391 of 
the R vised tatutes of the United tates, whereby the existing laws of tho State of 
Colorad may be made available for the punishment of offenses committed on your 
reservation. A.s the law now is, only murder, and perhaps a few of the more serious 
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crimes, can be punished in the civil courts when the offense is committed there. I 
send you inclosed a copy of a recent Montana decision (United Stat~s v. Barnaby), 
in which substantially tlle same question a~ ours arose, and was similarly disposed of. 
I write this note hurriedly, and would be glad that it be shown, if convenient, to 
Capt. Que11 tin, of your post, who also took an interest in the case of the unfortunate 
Chinamen. 
The decision, I may add, of Judge Hallett finally disposed of the present offenders. 
It is to be hoped that in the future the state of the law may be such as to fitly 
punish all who imitate Curran and his crowd. · 
Very respectfully, 
Col. H. C. MERRIAM, 
Fo1·t Logan, Colo. 
JOHN D. FLEMING, 
United States Attorney for Colorado. 
In the district court of the United States for the district of Colorado, December 
23, 1892. 
HALLETT, J. (oralJy): The United States against William E. Curran a:pd others 
is a prosecution for inciting a riot and committing an assault upon certain China-
men on the reservation at Fort Logan. 
This is alleged to be in violation of a la,w of the State, which is put in force by 
section 5391 of t,he Revised Statutes of the United States. This section was enacted 
first in 1825 and again in 1866, and it refers to the laws of States then existing. The 
act was so construed in Paul's Case, 6 Peters, 141 (U. S. Supreme Court). 
As Colorado was not then a State in the Union, none of its laws were adopted or 
put in force by this act. This section will never be operative in Colorado to put in 
force the laws of the State in respect to crimes committed on Government reserva-
tions unless reenacted. 
The motion to quash will be sustained. 
UNITED STATES V. BARNABY. 
[Circuit court, D. Montana. Juue 7, 1892.] 
KNOWLES, District Judge. The defendant was charged in the indictment in thfs 
case wit,h an assault with the intent to commit murder. He was tried and by the 
jury found guilty of this offense. Counsel for defendant now c9m~ into this court 
and movetlle court that thejudgmentherein be arrested. Among the grounds for this 
motion are that the indictment alh·ges no offense known to the laws of the United 
States; that for the crime alleged in the indictment and proven at the trial there 
is no punishment provided by the United States laws. Upon an examination of 
the statutes of the United State,i, I find no such crime namecl as an assault with 
the intent to commit murder. There is a punishment provided in the 5342d sec-
tion of Revised Statutes of United States for the crime of an attempt to commit 
murder or manslaughter by any means not constituting an assault with a dan-
gerous weapon. I suppose the meani11g of this latter clause, not constituting an 
assault with a dangerous weapon, means nothing more than that the attempt to 
commit murder must amount to something more or different from that of an assault 
with a dangerous weapon, because such an assault is made a crime of itself. In 
the crime of an attempt to commit murder, or an assault with the intent to commit 
murder, there is the ingredient of malice aforethought, express or presumed. When 
this ingredient in a crime exists, although the assault may be accompanied with the 
use of a deadly weapon, I shoulcl think there would be no difficulty in maintaining 
a proper charge of au attempt to commit murder. The facts stated would constitute 
something more than an assault with a deadly weapon, and not that alone. The 
indictment in this case charges that the defendant made an assault with a knife 
upon one Alexander Ashley with the intent him to kill wi.llfully, feloniously, and of 
his malice aforethought. There is no charge that the defendant struck Ashley with 
this knife or inflicted upon him any wounds or battery which would have had the 
tendency to produce <lea.th. 'rhere are no allegations as to the character of the knife 
used. The question is then presented as to whether the indictment shows sufficient 
to warr~nt the court in saying that it appears that the crime of an attempt to commit 
murder 1s presented. "The word 'attempt' signifies both the act and the intent with 
which the act is done." (2 Bish. Crim. Proc., sections 88, 89.) In speaking of an 
H.Rep. l-33 
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indi tment for an attempt, the same author say (section 92): "The attempt ma.y be 
a crim r may not be, and the indictment should state such facts as will nab le the 
court to say whether the particular attempt con titutes a crime oruot." An ''a sault" 
i generally cl tined to be an unlawful attempt coupled wit~ a present abi~ity to com-
mit a viol nt injury upon the person of another. ·when a SUDple assaultis alleged, a. 
court can not judicially see whether or not it is of such a nature, if consummated, 
d ath would ensue. From the very nature of the definition it will be seen that a 
ourt can not see from such a charge that it inv(!lves an act whi_ch -:ou~d effectuate 
the purpose a1leged. 1 Whart. Crrm. Law, section 190, says: ·'In md1ctments for 
attempts tho laxity in assaults will not be maintained." That author giv s as a 
reason for this that the term "assault" is one "which describes an act easily defined, 
and asserts a consummated offense;" while" 'attempt'is atermpecuUarly indefinite." 
''It has no prescribed legal meaning; it relates, from its nature: to an unconsummated 
offense." Again, he says, in section 192: "On the same reasoning, in an indictment 
for an attempt to commit a crime, it is essential to aver that the defendant did some 
act which? directed b_y a particular in~ent ~o be ave:rred, wo1;1ld apparently result, 
in the ordmary and likely course of thmgs, m a particular crime." The same rule 
is expressed, in effect, in section 749 et seq., 2 Bish. Crim. Law. It will be seen 
from these authorities that there were not sufficient facts set forth in the indict-
ment in this case to warrant the court in holding that the attempt to commit mur-
der or manslaughter was charged. Generally the crime of assault with the intent 
to commit murder is defined by statute law. When so defined, if the indictment 
follows substantially the language of the statute in charging the offense, it will 
generally be sufficient, bnt when not so defined facts must be alleged which will 
make the crime judicially appear. 
The question arises as to whether or not the crime of an assault does not appear 
sufficiently in the indictment. It is charged that the defendant made an assault 
upon Ashley. '£here is, however, no punishment prQvided for a simple assault com-
mitted in a place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States except in 
specifi d cases of which the one under consideration is not classed. There is a pun-
ishment provided for an assault committed by one belonging to t,he Navy, which is 
to be d reed by a court-martial; there is a punishment provided for an assault 
committed upon a public minister; an assault upon the high seas is punished; one 
committed by a person in the Army, in time of war, or upon a superior officer in the 
Airny, or upon a letter carrier, or on officers by seamen, or upon an officer authorized 
to cute 1,>rocess, or upon a custom-house officer when in the execution of duty, 
i a h punished by provisions of statute. It will be seen that the special instances 
here named do not include an assault of one pe1son upon another in any such place 
a n Indian reservation. It is a settled rnle in l?ederal jurisprudence that there 
are no romon-law offenses against the United States, and that no punishment can 
b infli t d for any common-law offenses unless the punishment therefor is specially 
provicl d for by Con~ress. It is claimed, however, that there are two statutes of 
th nit d tates wh1ch provide for the punishment of the crime in question. The 
fir t of th e i found in 23 Statutes at Large, p. 385, section 9, and is as follows: 
"That immediately upon and after the date of the passage of this act all Indians 
ommitting again t the person or property of another Indian or other person any of 
the following crimes, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to 
kill, ar on, burglary, and larceny, within any Territory of the United States, and 
either within or without an Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws 
of nch Territory relating to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same 
courts and in the same manner, and shall be subject to the same penalties, as are all 
other persons charged with the commission of said crimes, respectively; and the 
said courts are hereby giv~n jurisdiction in all such cases. And all such 
Indians committing any of the above crimes against the person or property of 
another Indian or other person within the boundaries of any State of the United 
States, and within tbe limits of any Indian reservation, shall be subject to the same 
laws, _ri d in the same courts and in the same manner, and subject t o the same 
penalties as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes within the 
exclusive juri diction of the United States." 
Montana has cea ed to be a Territory, and hence the first part of the above sec-
tion does not apply. AB I have shown, the punishment for the crime of an assn.ult 
with intent to COID;1llit murder.or manslaugh_ter nor the crime of assault, except in 
enumerated cases, 1 not established by a Umted States statute, although committed 
within a place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. An assault 
with int nt to kill is not the same offense as an assault with the intent to commit 
murder. There may not exist in the former the element of malice aforetbouo-ht; 
tb re may ?e an unlawful and intentional killing, which does not amount to rnm%er. 
(State v. Hll~, 4: Dev: and B., 4~1i Hor. and T. Cas .. , 199; Com. v. Dru~, Id., 190.) If 
an a sault with the mtent to kil was the same crime as an assault with the inten1i 
io commit murder, no punishrpent is provided for either. 
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The second of the statutes before alluded to is as Mhows: 
"If any offense be committed in any place which bas been or may hereafter be 
ceded to and under the jurisdiction of the United St::i.tes, which offense is not pro-
hibited, or the punishment thereof is not specially provided for, by any law of the 
United States, such offense shall be liable to and receive the same punishment as 
the la,ws of the State in which such place is situated, now in force, provided for the 
like offense when committed within the jurisdiction of such State; and no subse-
quent repeal of any such State law shall affect any prosecution for such offense in 
any court of the United States." (Section 5391, Rev. Stat. U. S.) 
This statute bas been construed by the Supreme Court in- the case of United States 
v. Paul, 6 Pet., 141, a,nd held to apply to State statutes punishing crimes which 
existed at the time of the passage of this statute. This decision bas at no time been 
reversed or doubted by that court, and was a contemporaneous judicial construction 
of the same, and should be adhered to. Considering the language of the statute ( and 
I do not see how any other conclusion could be reached), Congress might be willing 
to adopt the laws of a State which existed at the time of the passage of a statute by 
it, but would hardly be willing beforehand to adopt all the criminal statutes a State 
might in future enact. A statute to this effect might be classed as delegating legis-
lative authority, which is not proper. This statute was passed in 1825. But the 
construction contended for, namely, that it applied to any laws which might exist 
in any State, at any time when a place might be ceded by it to the United States, 
brings us to no different conclusion. In the case of the United States v. Kagama (118 
U. S., 375; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1109) the Supreme Court, in speaking of Indian tribes, 
said: 
"They were and always have been regarded as having a semiindependent position 
when they preserved their tribal relations, not as States, not as nations, not as pos-
sessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power 
of regulating their internal social relations, and thus far not brought under the 
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided." 
This view was largely supported by the cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 
Pet., 1; Worcesterv. Georgia, 6 Pet., 515. The evidence in this case showed that the 
defendant and the witness, Ashley, upon whom the offense was Jommitted, were 
both members of the Flathead tribe of Indians, under the charge of an Indian agent. 
It is safe, therefore, to assert that Montana could pass no criminal statute affecting 
the members of this Indian tribe in their relations with each other, and that it bas 
not done so. In the case of United States v. Kagama, supra, the Supreme Court said 
of Indians occupying such relations as these Indians: "They owe no allegiance to 
the State, and receive from them no protection." I do not say that when an Indian 
commits a crime against a white man within the State and off of a reservation he can 
not be punished by the laws of the State where the offense was committed, but the 
State can not regulate in any manner the social relations of the members of an organ-
ized Indian tribe among themselves. There was then no law of Montana touching this 
crime at the time the Flathead Indian Reservation was ceded, if ever, to the United 
States. I hardly think that the agreement by which the United States retained 
jurisdiction over the Flathead Indian Reservation can be called a ceding to the United 
States of the same. For these reasons I find that the defendant committed no crime 
for which this court can enter a judgment punishing him. As the Government of the 
United States has undertaken to control Indians by laws, and has left them no longer 
to be controlled by their tribal rules a.nd regulations, it is to be regretted that an 
adequate and proper code of laws to this end has not been enacted by Congress. This 
attempt to adopt Territorial and State laws may be classed as indolent legislation, 
not well adapted to producing order upon Indian reservations, or in those places 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Government, and allowing men guilty 
of crimes, demanding in all civilized governments punishment, as in this case, to 
escape their just deserts. The motion in arrest of judgment is sustained, and the 
defendant discharged from custody. 
WAR DEPARTMENT, JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
Washington, Septem.ber 29, 1899. 
SIR: Section 5391 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is as follows: 
"If any offense be committed in any place which has been or may hereafter be 
ceded to and under the jurisdiction of the United States, which offense is not pro-
hibited, or the punishment thereof is not specially provided fur, by any law of the 
United States, such offense shall be liable to and receive the same punishment as 
the laws of the State in which such place is situated, now in force, provide for the 
like offense when committed within the jurisdiction of such State; and no subse-
quent repeal of any such State law shall affect any prosecution for such offense in 
any court of the United States." 
8 AMENDING SECTION 5391, REVISED STATUTES. 
This is taken from an enactment of April 5, 1866. In 1832 the Supreme Court (in 
United States v. Paul, 6 Peters, 141), passing upon a similar act of March 3, 1825, 
said that it was to be limited to the laws of the States in force at the time of its 
enactment. 
In 1892 the circuit court for the district of Montana in the case of United States 
v. Barnaby (51 F. R., 20) followed the decision of the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Paul, and the district court for the district of Colorado held similarly in the 
United States v. Curra,n and others indfoted in 1892 for riot and assault. 
That is to say, as the law is held to be the only criminal law in force on a place 
under such jurisdiction of t,he United States is such criminal law of the United 
States as may be applicable, and if it is a place jurisdiction over which has been 
ceded to the United States by a State existing in 1866, the laws of the State in force 
at that time. So t hat, as in the Montana and Colorado cases referred to, the crim-
inal laws of the State can not be enforced over the ceded territory because the 
States were not in existence at the time of said enactment. .And in State which 
were in existence at that time the criminal laws adopted in such States since then 
can not, under the legislation as interpreted by the courts, be extended over such 
territory. In the Montana and Colorado cases riot and assault were thus held not 
punishable. 
It is evident, therefore, that the law needs amendment. It is regarded as imprac-
ticable for Congress to enact a full penal code to apply to such territory, but 
appears to be very much better to supplement (as was done in 1825 and1866) the laws 
of the nited States with the existing laws of the States. What seems to be most 
desirable now is to bring the legislation contained in section 5391 of the Revised 
Si;atutes to date. If, however, that should be done by a separate piece oflegisla-
tion, it is evident that it would from year to year fall behind the State legislation, 
so that in time there would arise a difficulty similar to that now existing. This can 
not be provided for by adopting beforehand all the criminal laws of a State which 
shall be in force at the time of the commission of the criminal act, because that 
would be a delegation by Congress of its legislative power to the States. In order 
to overcome this difficulty it is suggested that a provision somewhat like section 
5391 should be annually enacted that would incorporate the State legislation from 
year to year. 
I submit herewith the draft of such legislation and recommend that steps be taken 
to have it placed in the next sundry civil expenses act under the head of "Judicial, 
United St, tes courts," to be every year reenacted therein. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
G. NORMAN LIEBER, 
Acting Judge-Advocate-General. 
If any offense be committed in any place, jurisdiction over which has been re-
tained by the United States, or ceded to it by a State, or which has bee'n purchased 
with t he consent of a tate for the erection of a fort, magazil;1.e, arsenal, dock yard, 
or other needful building, the punishment for which offense is not provided for by 
any law of the United States, such offense shall, upon conviction in a circuit or dis-
trict court of the United States for the district in which it was committed, be liable 
to and receive the same punishment as the laws of the State in which such place is 
situated, now in force, provide for the like offense when committed within the juris-
diction of such State; and no subsequent repeal of any such State law shall affect 
any such prosecution. 
EXHIBIT B. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Washington, D. C., October 20, 1899. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th 
instanti~ inclosing House bill amendatory of section 5391 of the Revised Statutes 
of the united tates, copy of letter from the Secretary of War of date October 6 
1 92, to the peaker of the House of Representatives, and copy of letter of January 
20, 18&3, from Col. H. C. Merriam, Seventh. Infantry, commanding at Fort Logan, 
Colo., to the .Adjutant-General, U. S . .Army, together with various indorsements 
thereon, upon which you ask my opinion as to the necessity of the proposed amend-
ment . 
. In reply I be()' leave to state that I have considered with care your letter and 
mclosures, and find that the question presented is one to which the attention of this 
Department has been heretofore directed-the inadequacy of existing statutes of 
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the United States to secure the punishment of persons committing certain offenses 
in places where the General Government possesses jurisdiction, and am of the opinion 
that legislation is urgently required to remedy this defect in the law. The practical 
result of this want of effective legislation is so clearly shown by the occurrence 
referred to in the communications from the Secretary of War and Col. Merriam 
that further demonstration of the necessity of Congressional action would seem to 
be uncalled for. 
Whether it is your wish that I advise only as to the need of some action to be 
taken, or whether you desire ·my views concerning the form of the inclosed bill, I 
am somewhat at a loss to determine from your letter. Rather, however, than fail to 
respond fully to your inquiry, I beg to offer the following suggestions: 
(1) It seems to me that the insertion of the words contained in the pencil memo-
randum which I find at the foot of the first page of the bill submitted, evidently 
designed to be introduced in the eleventh and twelfth lines, so that thus corrected 
those lines and the thirteenth shall read (subsequent to the first word of the elev-
enth line) "the person so committing the same shall, upon conviction in a circuit 
or district court of the United States for the district in which such an offense was 
committed," would be desirable. 
(2) It occurs to me that the following words, contained in the thirteenth, four-
teenth, and :fifteenth lines of the bill, may be less definite than might be found 
desirable, viz, "be liable to and receive the same punishment as the existing laws of 
the State in which such place is situated provide for the like offense," etc. Th~ 
question might arise as to whether the laws existing at the time of the enactment of 
this bill or those existing at the time of the commission of the offense were thuw 
referred to. 
(3) I concur in the opinion expressed by Acting Judge-Advocate-General G. Nor-
man Lieber, that a law adopting, in advance, whatever statutes should thereafter be 
enacted by the several States would amount to an attempted delegation of the 
Congressional legislative power, which would probably be inoperative; and, further, 
that, if operative, such a law would be of much emb~Lrrassment to the Government, 
inasmuch as it would place in the power of the various State legislatures in large 
measure the molding in the future of the national legislation and policy pertaining 
to the punishment of crimes; which view, it seems, was entertained by the circuit 
court of the United States for the district of Montana, cited by Mr. John D. Flem-
ing, United States attorney for Colorado, in his communication to Col. Merriam, 
and which opinion appears at length in the papers tranAmitted to me. 
With the submission of these suggestions, I beg to state that I regard as desirable 
the enactment of the bill under consideration. 
Respectfully, · 
Hon. F. C. LAYTON, M. C., 
RICHARD OLNEY, 
.Attorney-General. 
Chairman Bubcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
Hou8e of .RepreBentatsf.161. 
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